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Abstract
Social machines are systems formed by material and human elements interacting in a structured way. The use of digital 
platforms as mediators allows large numbers of humans to participate in such machines, which have interconnected AI and 
human components operating as a single system capable of highly sophisticated behaviour. Under certain conditions, such 
systems can be understood as autonomous goal-driven agents. Many popular online platforms can be regarded as instances of 
this class of agent. We argue that autonomous social machines provide a new paradigm for the design of intelligent systems, 
marking a new phase in AI. After describing the characteristics of goal-driven social machines, we discuss the consequences 
of their adoption, for the practice of artificial intelligence as well as for its regulation.
Keywords Intelligent agents · Social machines · Artificial intelligence · Human–computer interaction · Cybernetics · 
Autonomous agents · Teleology
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, digital platforms have become social 
intermediaries, often powered by recommendation algo-
rithms, and incorporated into online shops, news aggrega-
tors, marketplaces, service sharing, video streaming and 
social networks. The automation of high-quality decisions 
about complex situations has enabled the replacement of 
human operators and displaced many forms of human cul-
ture. Some digital platforms have over a billion users (e.g., 
Facebook reported 1.9 billion daily average users, and 2.9 
billion monthly average users, in June 2021; Facebook 
2021).
To discuss such systems, we use the concept of “social 
machines”, which originates with Berners-Lee and Fischetti 
1999, although we change somewhat its original emphasis. 
A machine is an apparatus composed of specialised mate-
rial parts interacting together to do a particular type of 
work. There may be very different substrates of those parts, 
which can include—for example—hydraulic, electrical, 
and mechanical components. A social machine (SM) is a 
machine in which some components, carrying out specific 
subtasks, are human beings (whom we call ‘participants’). 
In the case of present interest, the interaction of human par-
ticipants is mediated by a digital infrastructure that provides 
them with information and constrains the actions and com-
munications that they can take. There has been considerable 
work in this area over the past few years (Shadbolt et al. 
2019; Smart and Shadbolt 2014). However, we somewhat 
reframe the notions of autonomy and teleology used in that 
literature, making them more apt and specific.
This article identifies a subclass of SMs that can be 
regarded as autonomous and goal-driven, and therefore 
considered as intelligent agents. We argue that some of the 
digital platforms mentioned above can be understood in this 
way, and we do so to examine some of their consequences 
for society.
We assume a restricted definition of intelligence as intel-
ligent behaviour, as commonly assumed in modern artificial 
intelligence (AI) and biology (Turing, 1948; Russell and 
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Norvig 2002; McFarland and Bösser 2002). We focus on 
goal-driven intelligent behaviour, assuming that artificial, 
biological, and even social systems can behave intelligently 
when they make choices that are better than random at 
achieving goals. This behaviour is also sometimes called 
`purposeful’ or `teleological’ in cybernetics (Rosenblueth 
et al. 1943; Wiener 1948), and `rational’ in economics and 
game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953). On this 
view, ant colonies pursuing their goals of building nests dis-
play intelligent behaviour, as do online recommender sys-
tems pursuing their goals of user engagement.
We argue that AI-enabled social machines endowed with 
autonomous and teleological behaviour exist, and that there 
is no need for their goals to be aligned with those of their 
participants. After defining some key terms and giving some 
examples, we discuss some implications of this observation 
for both Artificial Intelligence and for Society.
Typical examples of such machines include systems based 
on collaborative filtering, commonly used in the automatic 
recommendation of media content online, where individual 
participants have the aim of finding the information they 
need, while the overall system is pursuing a different goal, 
such as maximising advertising revenue. Other examples 
include online marketplaces, where users can bid for items, 
or cooperative video games. These systems are mediated by 
statistical or learning algorithms and informed by interac-
tions and iterated feedback among large numbers of users.
These new macroscopic agents are not just informed by 
observing the behaviour of their users, they co-opt them as 
participants to delegate to them delicate decision-making 
tasks. A steady stream of elementary choices is elicited, 
gathered, and repackaged to inform the behaviour of the 
system, enabling it to make decisions for which there is cur-
rently no algorithm.
To keep the discussion simple, we adopt here the defini-
tion of artificial intelligence used by the European Com-
mission (EU HLEG AI 2019): “Artificial intelligence (AI) 
refers to systems designed by humans that, given a com-
plex goal, act in the physical or digital world by perceiving 
their environment, interpreting the collected structured or 
unstructured data, reasoning on the knowledge derived from 
this data and deciding the best action(s) to take (according to 
predefined parameters) to achieve the given goal.”
In other words, we define intelligent behaviour as “decid-
ing the best actions to achieve a given goal, either in the 
physical or the digital world”. We, therefore, rephrase the 
question posed by Alan Turing in 1948: “whether it is pos-
sible for machinery to show intelligent behaviour” (Turing 
1948, p. 1) as “whether it is possible for SMs to show auton-
omous and purposeful behaviour”. Sections 2, 3 and 4 are 
devoted to answering this question.
We observe that under these definitions, a collaborative 
filtering algorithm together with its users, such as the one 
recommending videos on YouTube, qualifies as an autono-
mous and goal-driven SM, as well as an intelligent agent. Its 
behaviour is not determined solely by an algorithm, but by 
its application to the usage patterns of myriad users, none 
of which is in the position to control it. There is no homun-
culus in charge of such systems, which can be likened to 
ant colonies or the human brain, because adaptive behav-
iour emerges from the interactions of their parts involving 
many iterations of feedback between them. The behaviour 
of such SMs results from the interaction of components, 
some of which happen to be human users (who do not need 
to be willing or aware participants). The seat of intelligence 
in those systems is neither in the algorithm nor in the par-
ticipants but in the interaction of all the components (See 
for example Dennett and Hofstaedter 1981; Boden 1990; 
Kurzweil 2002; Ladyman and Wiesner 2020 discuss the 
emergent intelligence of social insects and other aspects of 
complex systems relevant to social machines including the 
importance of iterated interaction and feedback).
The consequences of these observations for the practice 
of intelligent systems design, as well as for their legal regu-
lation, are important and considered in Sects. 5 and 6.
2  Teleological (goal‑driven) agents
An agent is any system that can choose among multiple 
actions on the environment, in the sense that there is at 
least one variable in the environment the value of which 
depends on its choice. In general, there are various possible 
incompatible actions among which a choice is made, and 
the state of the environment that results probabilistically 
depends on the action performed. This definition of agent is 
general and includes, for example, organisms, artifacts, and 
organizations.
An agent is autonomous if it chooses its actions “by 
itself”, in the sense that its internal processes and states 
determine the choices in a way that depends on its current 
and previous interactions with the environment. An agent 
which is not autonomous, but whose actions are chosen by 
an external controller (or process), is heteronomous. Exam-
ples of autonomous agents include software agents whose 
actions are chosen by them in response to the specific situ-
ation, as in the familiar case of a personalised video recom-
mendation portal; an example of a heteronomous agent may 
be a bureaucracy worker always performing the same actions 
as directed and without regard for the overall outcome.
A teleological (or goal-driven, or purposeful) agent is 
an autonomous agent whose behaviour can be modelled as 
choosing based on the expected utility of the outcomes of the 
different actions it can perform. These actions do not neces-
sarily need to be optimal, nor to have deterministic effects 
on the environment, but on average the agent’s behaviour 
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must do better than random in achieving some outcome, 
which can then be thought of as the agent’s goal and hence 
as having utility for it. Of course, the same behaviour may 
be teleological in one environment, and not teleological in 
another environment (and teleological behaviour is not pos-
sible if the effects of actions on the environment are com-
pletely random). This class of agents that can fruitfully be 
described in non-causal language are called purposeful, as 
used in the classic paper (Rosenblueth et al. 1943): “The 
term purposeful is meant to denote that the act or behaviour 
may be interpreted as directed to the attainment of a goal.”
Typically, agents must have information about the state 
of their environment to calculate the expected utility of dif-
ferent actions, in other words they need to be able to sense. 
An agent “senses” the environment if at least one variable 
of the agent’s internal state can be coupled with at least one 
variable in the state of the environment and then used in 
information-processing about what choice to make.
The fact that the overall goal is normally set by the exter-
nal designer of the agent does not necessarily reduce the 
autonomy of the agent, in that the agent still chooses its 
own actions. For example, all American eels migrate to the 
Sargasso Sea each year, but individual eels choose the neces-
sary actions based on their specific situation, making them 
autonomous agents.
For the rest of this paper, we refer to any agents that 
autonomously make informed decisions in pursuit of goals 
as “intelligent”, and we use interchangeably the expressions 
“goal-driven”, “purposeful”, and “teleological” to describe 
behaviour. Note that pursuing a goal might include maximis-
ing utility or maintaining homeostasis.
3  Social machines
SMs are particular types of machine in which some com-
ponents, carrying out specific subtasks, are human beings 
(whom we call ‘participants’). While the authors of (Bern-
ers-Lee and Fischetti 1999) presuppose a digital infrastruc-
ture to mediate the activities of the participants, the mediator 
could be a physical bureaucracy, or machinery. What is key 
is that the interaction among the participants is mediated by 
the infrastructure via a standardised interface that can also 
constrain the options that are available to the participants 
and how they communicate.
Mechanisms incorporating ‘participants’ can be found 
in multiple areas and include assembly lines, bureaucra-
cies, auctions, markets, voting schemes, product delivery 
services, games, peer production, crowdsourcing, and 
so on. Their interaction can be mediated by forms, bal-
lots, purchase orders, and IT systems. In this study, we 
are particularly interested in cases where an intelligent 
software infrastructure mediates the interactions among 
the various participants, constraining and standardising 
their actions, monitoring performance, and possibly also 
assigning incentives.
The most recent generation of SMs builds upon web-
based infrastructures, which affords them many possibili-
ties that were not available to previous versions such as 
bureaucracies or assembly lines. Not only does this allow 
them to include billions of participants, creating com-
pletely new dynamics, but also to rapidly transfer infor-
mation from one part of the system to another.
Two different examples show the range of possibilities 
and illustrate where our emphasis differs from the perspec-
tive normally taken in the study of SMs (Shadbolt et al. 
2019).
Online crowdsourcing services, such as Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk, operate as modern assembly lines, 
where thousands of workers are active at any given time 
(Difallah et al. 2018) to perform well specified tasks that 
might be difficult to automate. In this type of modern SM 
participants can be asked—for example—to perform very 
specific tasks, such as tagging photos and videos, enter-
ing data from handwritten receipts, categorizing images, 
answering questions and so forth. The tasks are tightly 
specified from outside the SM, which is mostly used to 
distribute the tasks to many participants and monitor their 
performance. They may not be aware of the overall pur-
poses of the “customer”, but they do understand what is 
the task that they are completing. The system is executing 
externally set tasks.
Such cases stand in sharp contrast with recommender sys-
tems (Ricci et al. 2011), such as those used in video stream-
ing and social media, and which are typically mediated by 
collaborative filtering algorithms. In this case, as a user 
accesses some type of content, their spontaneous activity is 
monitored, so that the system can infer detailed information 
about both its users and its catalogue of items. The system 
is using this information both to steer the individual user 
towards clicking on certain content, and to learn how to treat 
new users or new content. Maintaining high performance 
is important for the constant co-optation of participants, so 
that the system approaches the condition of an autopoietic 
process (Maturana and Varela 1991).
The information is not explicitly given to the system by 
the users, rather it comes through “implicit feedback” (Oard 
and Kim 1998). In the example of YouTube, for each choice 
made by a user, a wealth of information is recorded: such 
as whether a user is logged or not, IDs of watched videos, 
watch time, clicked and unclicked video impressions, time 
since last watched video, and so on (Covington 2016). With 
each action, users disclose personal preferences and interests 
to the system (Burr et al. 2018) and without their contri-
bution the whole machine would not be able to do its job, 
which is to offer personalised recommendations that lead to 
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some kind of user engagement (for example, the user watch-
ing adverts).
The system is pursuing an externally set goal (perhaps to 
increase traffic and advertising revenue) but is not execut-
ing external given instructions: it is making its own choices, 
while pursuing its given goal.
When considering the relation between participants and 
the machine of which they are part we refer to the behaviour 
of participants and that of the system, as the `micro’ and 
'macro’ levels, respectively. The macro-level behaviour of 
the SM depends on the micro-level behaviour of each par-
ticipant, which itself depends on the behaviour of the non-
human and other human components of the SM. Agents at 
both levels can be autonomous or heteronomous.
Crowdsourcing SMs are often heteronomous, in that 
someone external to the system decides which specific 
tasks need to be completed, while recommender systems are 
autonomous. It is this second class of systems with which 
we are concerned here.
4  Teleological social machines
In the light of the previous section, it is clear that SMs can 
be autonomous and teleological, and can therefore meet 
the conditions for intelligent behaviour in Sect. 2. A sim-
ple example shows how an autonomous SM can be created 
whose effect is to pursue a specific goal (at the macro-level), 
which its participants (at the micro-level) cannot control.
4.1  Examples
The ESP game consists of an online platform where thou-
sands of pairs of players are randomly matched to play a sort 
of guessing game without communicating with one another. 
The objective is to guess which label the other partner will 
assign to a given image that both players can see. Since 
coordination among players is ruled out by the design of 
the interface and the randomised matching, for each player 
the optimal strategy to maximise their own score is to guess 
the most probable word describing each image, and a spon-
taneous consequence of multiple participants playing this 
game is the production of high-quality annotation for large 
dataset. Experiments with the ESP game showed that in 
1 month 5,000 people can produce accurate labels for more 
than 400,000,000 images (von Ahn and Dabbish 2004; von 
Ahn et al. 2002). While the goal of individual players is 
playing a video game, the overall effect at the macro-level is 
to generate increasingly reliable data annotation. This spon-
taneous tendency towards a state is goal-driven behaviour 
in the sense of Sect. 2, and it emerges from the structure of 
the game.
The example of the ESP game makes a number of points 
clear. Most importantly, the goals of participants may be dif-
ferent from the goals of the system, participants do not even 
need to be aware that they are part of a system which has 
goals. The spontaneous drift of the system towards a state 
where the data is increasingly well annotated is an instance 
of what Adam Smith called “the invisible hand” that guides 
the markets while the participants pursue their own goals. 
The case of this game has other features in common with 
markets: it is an example of a “strategic game”, where the 
benefits of actions depend on the actions taken by other 
players. These can be either competitive (as in markets) or 
cooperative (as in the ESP game). In both cases, the “invis-
ible hand” can guide the system towards a macro-level goal.
This class of SMs is more specific than those commonly 
studied, typically based on the principle of “crowdsourcing” 
in which a task is broken into smaller tasks, and then distrib-
uted among willing participants, much like for the Mechani-
cal Turk described above (Shadbolt et al. 2019; Smart et al. 
2014; Berners-Lee and Fischetti 1999).
An example of an autonomous SM which is not based on 
a strategic game is the recommender system, perhaps based 
on collaborative filtering, which is used to suggest books, 
videos, and even romantic partners. These systems work by 
leveraging the micro-decisions of a large number of partici-
pants, and using them to steer towards a goal, but they are 
not requested to make strategic decisions, just to keep on 
choosing one item out of many proposed. It is this stream 
of choices that generates the necessary information for the 
macro-level system to steer autonomously towards its goal 
(for example, that of retaining participants, and maximising 
the time they spend on it) (Covington 2016).
4.2  The purpose of a system
The notion of rational agents naturally connects to the idea 
of a purpose in systems-cybernetics. The cyberneticist Staf-
ford Beer (Beer 2002) noticed how it is the behaviour of a 
system that reveals its “purposes”, by definition. This obser-
vation was turned into a popular slogan, known as the POSI-
WID principle from the initials of each word: “the purpose 
of a system is what it does” (Beer 2002). In other words, 
if the emergent behaviour of a system has the net effect of 
pursuing a certain goal, then this is the system’s purpose. 
We use this perspective, when we define the “telos” of an 
autonomous agent as the net effect of its choices. Using this 
language, we can say for example, that the interaction of a 
social machine such as eBay is framed in a way to identify 
the user willing to pay the highest price, when the goal of 
each user would be not to reveal that information, and to pay 
the lowest cost. The invisible hand of Adam Smith guides 
the system towards its telos, while individual users pursue 
their own.
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4.3  Value alignment
Modelling both participants and the whole SM as rational 
agents directly introduces the question of the alignment 
between utility at micro-level and at macro-level. The lack 
of alignment between the goals of a user with those of an 
AI system has been identified as a problem in (HHadfield-
Menell et al. 2017). For instance, YouTube and Facebook 
might have the goal of increasing the time that users spend 
with them, Amazon that of increasing the money they spend, 
while the users might have a different goal altogether.
4.4  Design principles for teleological social 
machines
In many circumstances, it would be desirable to program the 
behaviour of a SM at the macro-level to achieve a desired 
goal. For example, social network executives may want to 
pursue the goal of preventing outrageous contents. Unfortu-
nately, no general method is known to do this, and only very 
specific subcases have been solved. The problem of translat-
ing a desired macro-behaviour into a system of incentives 
for participants is a largely open technical question, in some 
communities called the micro–macro-problem, particularly 
in the case of sociological theory (Alexander et al. 1987). 
In one specific subcase, however, this has been studied: for 
strategic games such as auctions, or even the ESP game, 
there is a part of Game Theory whose purpose is to design 
the rules of the game, so that the system pursues a cho-
sen goal, while the participants can act “selfishly” (Börgers 
2015). This subfield is called “mechanism design” and its 
techniques are used—for example—to design eBay auctions, 
which are an example of the (few) cases in which we can 
“program” Teleological SMs.
5  Discussion
The use of social machines to implement goal-driven agents 
marks a fundamental change from previous attempts at cre-
ating autonomous systems, one that bypasses many of the 
technical problems encountered before, but also creates a 
new set of challenges. On the upside, it allows the system 
to perform tasks such as establishing the market price of a 
good, finding the best content to engage a human user, or 
annotating images, without needing a deep understanding 
of the underlying subject matter. Crucial cognitive tasks can 
be decomposed into elementary problems and automatically 
delivered to human participants who solve them, thereby 
contributing to the solution of a larger problem that they do 
not need to see or understand.
On the downside, we have built intelligent agents that 
include human participants, and mediate a range of their 
activities, and the dynamics of such distributed systems can 
produce emergent phenomena such as echo chambers, price 
inflation, reputation bubbles and so on. These are difficult 
if not impossible to model in advance. If no humans are 
in control of these behaviours, not even the designers and 
certainly not the participants, who holds responsibility for 
them? For example, is it reasonable to expect that a company 
should avoid the circulation of fake news on a system that 
they cannot steer? Is it reasonable to allow an autonomous 
agent to operate in this way? These are crucial issues for the 
design and regulation of AI.
5.1  The social turn in the field of AI
The current recipe for the generation of autonomous goal-
driven behaviour includes the use of human participants in 
larger systems which can only function when both machin-
ery and humans interact in a tightly regulated manner. Rec-
ommender systems, online marketplaces, even spam filters 
and spell checkers are implicitly powered by the behaviour 
of multiple participants. Many of them can be regarded as 
autonomous social machines, combining a powerful infra-
structure, clever algorithms, and millions of human users. 
The judgment and knowledge of participants, carefully elic-
ited by a digital infrastructure (sometimes during routine 
interaction), is a central ingredient in the decisions that the 
system will make in the future. Some of these participants 
are willing and paid task workers, others are unaware users, 
motivated by a diversity of goals (e.g., watching videos, 
deleting spam or buying products). This combination of 
databases, learning algorithms, and participants is a SM, and 
is in many cases autonomous, in the sense of not being con-
trolled by any other system, including its designer. Recent 
concerns about the fairness of intelligent systems have been 
traced to the social origins of their training data, showing 
that their behaviour may be less predictable and less control-
lable than their makers might have hoped (e.g., Cristianini 
and Scantamburlo 2019; Sutton et al. 2018; Jonauskaite et al. 
2021; Caliskan et al. 2017).
5.2  Consequences for individuals
The emergence of AI-enabled SMs has the potential to affect 
individuals in various ways (e.g., see Burr et al. 2018, for 
effects on human autonomy, and Cristianini  2019, for pos-
sible effects on fairness). The key point is that in this tech-
nology the interactions that give rise to the agent are all 
mediated by the software infrastructure, and human partici-
pants contribute by interacting with it through a constrained 
interface. This relation, where the interface is framed and 
controlled by the designer and its contents are adapted by 
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the software to each participant, makes the machines work 
but raises concerns for individuals. We explore two orders of 
concerns: for human autonomy (e.g., Cambridge Analytica) 
and for employment (Amazon Warehouse, Uber riders).
5.2.1  The power of mediators
An important consequence is the emergence of a number 
of workers who are directly managed by a software layer, 
via an interface which could be a phone app. Participants—
such as delivery drivers—are monitored and rewarded by 
an algorithm, and do not necessarily need to be aware of the 
overall goals they are part of pursuing. This can give rise to 
both ethical and management considerations about wellbe-
ing, with workers being forced by a mechanism to compete 
for the lowest wages, or nudged into working more than 
they would like, but also exposing them to the risk of being 
one day replaced by automated systems. Since their entire 
contribution is mediated by the software interface, the rest 
of the system would not be affected if they were replaced by 
a mechanism. This can involve Uber drivers (Wakabayashi 
and Conger 2018), Amazon warehouse workers (Soper 
2018), and various types of translators, writers, data cura-
tors. Many of these workers are already now working mostly 
to train their mechanic replacements. For those participants 
that contribute for free, instead, there are concerns involv-
ing the risk of exploitation (Rosenblatt 2018), particularly if 
there is the risk of behavioural addiction to certain services 
such as social media (Zendle  and Bowden-Jones 2019).
5.2.2  On choice architectures and nudging
The interaction of the participant with the machine is framed 
by the machine itself, the interfaces determine the affordances 
of the participant, shaping the architecture within which any 
choice is made. For any individual participant working in these 
conditions, life is framed by the information and the options 
made available by it. In some ways, it behaves like a Skinner 
Box. Three important considerations follow from this observa-
tion about choice architectures: the system can design “mecha-
nisms” (in the game-theoretic sense we defined above), by 
setting the micro-rules that the autonomous participant needs 
to follow; the system can exploit known psychological effects 
known collectively as “nudging”, to steer the decisions of the 
participants; and the system can extract some (rudimentary) 
psychometric information from the participant. The first point 
has been discussed above, the second point is addressed in 
Burr et al. (2018), which discusses a variety of interactions 
between a human user and an intelligent software agent and 
examples may range from coercion, to nudging and persua-
sion. Examples of nudging include the way information is pre-
sented to a user at the moment they are asked to make a choice 
such as accepting a cookie, selecting a method of payment, 
watching one more video: different ways to present the same 
options (called “choice architectures”) are known to lead to 
different decisions. The third point is discussed in (Burr and 
Cristianini 2019) where a series of examples are provided, 
in which the interaction between users and AI systems can 
disclose psychometric information about the users (Kosinski 
et al. 2013), an effect that was made widely known by the 
Cambridge Analytics affair. The main idea has analogies with 
the standard Item Response Theory of psychology: if you can 
carefully design a series of questions, you can observe samples 
of behaviour that will reveal latent information about the user.
5.3  Consequences for society
As we increasingly adopt SMs as part of our social infra-
structure, we have come to rely on them as powerful media-
tors for many social functions, and as a new mass medium. 
While their influence at an individual level has been dis-
cussed above, we need to consider the possible effects on 
society as a whole. As the delivery of media content is medi-
ated by a SM aimed at pursuing its own goals, what are the 
effects on public opinion or the economy? The same can 
be said for the recommendation of products, and effects on 
markets.
There are two key macro-level questions: how the 
machine can affect society, and how it can control its own 
participants. The second concern is rather fundamental: the 
internal (e.g., homeostatic) feedback loops that the machine 
uses to coordinate its own participants (e.g., incentive 
schemes), determine their overall behaviour. The degree of 
alignment between the goals of the machine and those of the 
designers might depend on the emergent dynamics connect-
ing all participants via the infrastructure.
In some cases, SMs can be seen as mediating the com-
munications between participants and coordinating their 
behaviour. This can result in various feedback dynamics, 
for example echo chambers that could promote “fake news”. 
This can be seen as a sort of swarming behaviour, with popu-
larity bubbles for videos, news, and products, whose control 
is not currently well understood.
6  Conclusions
There is a class of social machines that satisfy a standard 
definition of intelligence and can be understood as auton-
omous and goal-driven agents. Various online platforms 
that are currently used for a range of applications belong 
to this class: social networks (where contents are person-
ally recommended to maximise engagement), online shops 
(where products are recommended) and marketplaces (where 
products are recommended and prices are established by 
a social mechanism), are all based on the same principle, 
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of leveraging the decisions of millions of participants to 
inform the macroscopic behaviour of the system. Various 
outsourcing and sharing services follow similar principles 
(e.g., in car sharing, where human participants are matched 
with the customers by a similar mechanism). These systems 
do not just observe humans, they co-opt them, to be able to 
elicit the information needed for their operations. Human 
participants have no more control over the behaviour of the 
macro-system than do the cogs of a machine.
Understanding this class of systems is essential for their 
regulation, and this article proposes a unified terminology 
based on standard operational conceptions of intelligence 
and goal-driven behaviour. This conceptual framework can 
be useful for discussion of both design and of regulation. 
Thinking in terms of micro- and macro-levels, heteronomous 
and autonomous agents, participants and SMs, can help us 
make sense of this form of technology and the social chal-
lenges that it poses.
As early as 1960, Wiener suggested some moral problems 
“caused by the simultaneous action of the machine and the 
human being in a joint enterprise”. These include the issues 
of individuals operating at a slower time scale and the crea-
tion of more opaque systems: “The result of a programming 
technique of automatization is to remove from the mind of 
the designer and operator an effective understanding of many 
of the stages by which the machine comes to its conclu-
sions and of what the real tactical intentions of many of its 
operations may be” (Wiener 1960, p. 1358; see also (Wiener 
1954)).
We have reached a point in the evolution of AI where the 
question of Alan Turing “whether machines are capable of 
intelligent behaviour” interacts with Wiener’s concerns, as 
the current generation of AI agents and their human users 
together constitute social machines that can choose their own 
actions, while pursuing goals that are not necessarily set by 
their designers.
Most of the above examples are drawn from the area 
of online entertainment or commerce but in future such 
machines may not remain confined to those domains. As 
Turing warned in 1948, “the limited character of the machin-
ery which has been used until recent times […] encour-
aged the belief that machinery was necessarily limited to 
extremely straight-forward, possibly even to repetitive, 
jobs”. These systems are likely to be used in administration, 
education, and governance. Various proposals to use them 
for social regulations have been reviewed in (Cristianini and 
Scantamburlo 2019).
One important point is that there are agents whose actions 
are best understood in the light of their ‘goals’, as defined 
above, and this might help with their legal regulation. These 
are not the intended goals of the designers, nor the goals 
of the participants, but the emergent goals of the overall 
system, which may also drift as different participants are 
co-opted.
An important technical question for the future of the field 
is: how do we control such AI-enabled SMs? Setting aside 
the question of who has the right to do so, can the organi-
sation running one such system really control its specific 
behaviour? And a related ethical question is: who is respon-
sible for the behaviour of a SM? The users? The designers? 
The participants? The system itself?
We also need to face the important question of the effect 
of SMs on the individual participants and their autonomy 
and privacy, if SMs are—as it seems—capable of nudging 
and steering, and of accessing private information about 
their users. The Cambridge Analytica controversy about 
individual persuasion enabled by access to psychometric 
profiles of users, which were created based on their ordi-
nary activities (Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018) is 
an example of a much wider issue. The fundamental point 
in all this is defining the relation between human users and 
AI-enabled SMs, a problem that is currently open from a 
technical, social, legal, and humanistic viewpoint.
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